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Abstract There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists.
Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the
idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this repre-
sentation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is
distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paral-
leled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privi-
leged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct the history of the
arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin
Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I
argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presup-
positions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John
MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his dis-
tinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea.
1 Introduction
Arthur Prior (1967, chapter 7) proposed a novel perspective on indeterminism. He
suggested, probably inspired by a letter from Saul Kripke (cf. Øhrstrøm and Hasle
1995, pp. 174 ff.), that we should conceive of time as of a tree-like, branching
structure. Branching proceeds into the future and never into the past; the single
‘‘trunk’’ of any given moment represents its unique past and each ‘‘branch’’
represents a possible future continuation of this moment. Our world is indetermin-
istic if there is more than one branch on the tree of possibilities. Prior’s image grasps
a natural intuition that the possibilities available at different moments change. I
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could have run a marathon this year but it is no longer possible; there is too little
time left for me to prepare.
The idea proposed by Prior was ably developed and clarified by Thomason
(1970, 1984) who defined the tree of possibilities as a full-blown model of a tempo-
modal propositional logic. For historical reasons, this model is called Ockhamist (cf.
Definition 2). The formalism has proved to be very insightful. It has been used on
many occasions by philosophers, logicians and even computer scientists (for
historical details, see Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995; Brau¨ner et al. 2000). However, the
interpretation of the formalism has generated controversy from the very instant of its
creation. If one unpacks the details of the model and evaluation of sentences, one
realizes that to ascribe a truth value to a sentence, one needs to specify the future
branch with respect to which the truth value is ascribed. It is especially puzzling
when we deal with sentences in the future tense. A sentence like ‘‘The summer will
be hot’’ receives no interpretation whatsoever unless we specify one of the possible
continuations; then, the sentence is true in the continuations in which the summer is
hot, and false in those in which it is not. The formal details are outlined in Sect. 2.1.
The intuitive problem with this theory consists in the fact that there is no trace of
such specification of possible continuation in our everyday talk about the future
which this theory intends to model. Robert M. Adams additionally argues that such
analysis ‘‘deprives prediction of its normal point’’ (Adams 1974, p. 219; similar
arguments can be found in Malpass and Wawer 2012). Probably even Prior himself
envisaged the difficulties with branch relativization since he called the branch-
dependent ascriptions of truth values ‘‘prima facie’’ (Prior 1967, p. 126).
Additionally, he devised the so-called ‘‘Peircean’’ interpretation of sentences in
the branching model which is branch-independent. Thomason (1970) carefully
defined the Ockhamist semantics but he was far from endorsing it in full generality,
he just used it as a tool for his branch-independent supervaluational semantics.
Recently, MacFarlane (2003, 2008) applied a relativist semantics to explain our
predictions with no need of specification of a future branch. Finally, a group of
philosophers and logicians, beginning with McKim and Davis (1976), has tried to
extend Ockhamism. Their guiding idea was to distinguish only one of the possible
futures as relevant for establishing the truth values of future contingents—the future
that is going to happen. The roots of this theory are traced back to the Middle Ages
(cf. Øhrstrøm 1984 who claims that Anselm of Canterbury and William of Ockham
might be thought of as founding fathers and able proponents of the idea). All the
conceptions which appeal to the notion of a single future within the context of
Branching-Time (BT) are dubbed Thin Red Line (TRL) theories by Belnap and
Green (1994) and Belnap et al. (2001).
All the opponents of Ockhamism share the intuition that branch-relativized
analysis of predictions is unpalatable. They disagree about the appropriate
alternative. The Peirceans believe that every future contingent is simply false (Prior
1967). The supervaluationists claim that they lack the truth value (Thomason 1970).
The relativists maintain that the interpretation of a future contingent is relative to the
context of assessment; it is true as assessed from some contexts, false as assessed
from others and lacking the truth value from still others (MacFarlane 2003). The TRL
theory in turn posits that every future contingent is simply either true of false.
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Additionally, the truth value of such predictions is relative to neither a branch nor a
context of assessment; it depends only on what the future will bring. For sources of
motivation of the TRL theory and arguments against the alternative proposals consult
(McKim and Davis 1976; Øhrstrøm 1984, 2009; Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995; Brau¨ner
et al. 1998, 2000; Borghini and Giuliano 2011; Malpass and Wawer 2012).
It is important to stress that a Thin Red Line theorist (from now on a TRL-ist) is
usually also an indeterminist. Consequently, he does not believe that the truth of a
prediction entails its necessary truth. He apparently disagrees at this point with
Aristotle, Łukasiewicz, and Thomason; at the same time he is in agreement with
William of Ockham, Leibniz, and Øhrstrøm. However, the TRL-ist is often accused
of deterministic tendencies. He is claimed to privilege the uniqueness of the future
(and the bivalence of future contingents) over indeterminism.
I argue that the main incentive for the debate stems from competing conceptions
of our world and the possibilities inherent in this world. On the one hand, some
critics of the TRL embrace the metaphysical conception according to which our
world itself is an immense branching object that contains all the possibilities and all
the mutually incompatible events happening in them. On the other hand, the TRL
proponents take our world to be a much more modest object which realizes only one
of the available possibilities. The cost of such metaphysical modesty is the
abandonment of the clearly realistic notion of possibility that the former conception
proposes. TRL critics argue that one cannot have both Real Possibilities and such
limited conception of our world; TRL supporters claim that one can.
I propose a formalism general enough to express both points of view which does
not privilege either. I use this tool to outline a new approach to the problem of the
Thin Red Line, and argue that it is a sane philosophical position. However, my
proposal is at most conditionally accurate; it presupposes some realistic account of
(temporal) possibility which is not committed to concrete existence of the
possibilities.
I am going to proceed as follows: first, I will present the history of the discussion
of the idea of the TRL in the context of Branching-Time (BT) semantics. If one is not
interested in or familiar with the history of this idea, one can skip Sect. 2 (with the
exception of Sect. 2.1 which provides general semantic definitions); it should not
affect the overall clarity of the further reading. In Sect. 3, I present my own TRL
solution to the problem of future contingents preceded by the introduction of some
necessary conceptual background. Finally, Sect. 4 is devoted to answering the
logical, epistemological, objective, and ‘‘actuality’’ objections that were famously
formulated against the TRL theory by Belnap et al. (2001). I am not going to
criticize alternative theories of future contingents but instead focus on presentation
and defense of my own position. The competing approaches will be discussed only
as a background to my own proposal.
2 A Report on the War: The History of the Thin Red Line
In military terminology, the concept of the Thin Red Line refers to a certain
defensive complex. It consists of small in number but strategically deployed and
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usually well-equipped and trained military units. Due to their localization, they can
marginalize the factor of being outnumbered and defend even a large territory
against the prevailing forces of the enemy.
In the context of Branching-Time semantics, the Thin Red Line acquired a new
meaning, but I will use its military connotation to explicate the philosophical ideas
behind this concept. We shall see that the philosophical Thin Red Line was severely
bombarded, especially in 1994 and 2001, by Nuel Belnap and his allies. However,
the defenders never surrendered and often returned fire. I am going to present the
dialectic of the development of the concept of the TRL in a series of such ‘‘attacks’’
and ‘‘defenses’’. I organize these military maneuvers in logical rather than
chronological fashion, which means that I describe various versions of TRL
semantics from the simplest to the more complicated as responses to increasingly
challenging counter-arguments offered by its critics. This mode of presentation
might not completely coincide with the actual historical succession of ideas or
intentions of the authors, but I hope that it might be found revealing. I am going to
focus on the problems of the TRL theory which are called ‘‘logical’’ by Belnap et al.
(2001, p. 161) and might also be called ‘‘semantic’’ or ‘‘linguistic’’. The attacks
usually take the form of examples of sentences which sound intuitive and which are
valid in Ockhamism, but are invalidated by one or other of the TRL semantics. The
defenses are attempts to restore the validity of these sentences while preserving the
core of the TRL intuition.
Finally, I will propose my own strategy of defense of the Thin Red Line (Sect. 3)
I will show that my way of reinforcing the defenders helps them not only to repulse
the attacks, but even to mount counter-attacks in areas where the attackers’ lines are
overstretched (Sect. 4).
2.1 The Battle Field: Introduction to Ockhamism
To keep the exposition simple, I will consider models for a language containing
sentential variables (Var), truth-functional connectives ð^;:Þ and three modal
connectives: P (‘‘It was the case that’’), F (‘‘It will be the case that’’) and } (‘‘It is
possible that’’). All the modal connectives have natural duals: H: ¼ :P: (‘‘It has
always been the case that’’), G: ¼ :F: (‘‘It is always going to be the case that’’)
and h: ¼ :}: (‘‘It is settled that’’). The connectives _; !; $ are defined in a
classical manner. A well formed sentence / of the language is defined by standard
induction.
Definition 1 (BT-Model). A BT-model is a triple M: ¼ hM;\; Vi where:
• M = ;;
• \ is a partial order defined on M which satisfies the conditions of backward
linearity:
• 8m; m1; m2½ðm1\m ^ m2\mÞ ! ðm1\m2 _ m2\m1 _ m1 ¼ m2Þ,
and historical connectedness:
• Vm1, m2 A m3 m3 B m1 ^ m3 B m2;
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• V is a valuation function V : Var 7!}ðMÞ.1
Set M contains possible moments (instantaneous but spatially maximally
extensive stages of the world). Therefore, it is not time but the possibilities that
branch in the misleadingly named Branching-Time model. The relation\should be
thought of as a relation of modal-temporal precedence earlier-possibly later.
Finally, we need to formally define an important notion of a history2 which is a
maximal, linearly ordered by\, subset of W. I denote a history by the letter h. The
set of all histories in the model is denoted by Hist.
There are many ways to interpret the modal connectives within such defined BT
models. Our point of reference will be Ockhamism which is a version most
commonly used in philosophical logic.3 In this semantics the truth clauses are
defined for a model M and a pair m/h (the notation indicates that m 2 h).
Definition 2 (A sentence / is true in a BT-model M, at a point m/h).
• M; m=h p iff m 2 VðpÞ for p 2 Var;
• M; m=h:/ iff it is not the case that M; m=h/ ðM; m=h 6 /Þ;
• M; m=h/ ^ w iff M; m=h/ and M; m=hw;
• M; m=h P/ iff 9m0ðm0\m ^M;m0=h/Þ;
• M; m=hF/ iff 9m0ðm\m0 ^ m0 2 h ^M; m0=h/Þ;
• M; m=h}/ iff 9h0ðm 2 h0 ^M; m=h0 /Þ.
Notice that M is not an intended Kripke model for our language since the
‘‘points’’ at which we evaluate sentences are m/h pairs rather than simply moments
m from set M. This fact is reflected in the definition of modal connectives as well
since it is not simply\but rather history-related-\ that represents the accessibility
1 Some logicians (e.g. Zanardo 1996) assume an alternative, history-dependent notion of valuation
ðV :Var 7!}ðM  HistÞÞ but I think that it significantly reduces the philosophical attraction of BT theory.
If we accept the history dependent valuations in full generality, we lose most of the connection between
semantics and metaphysics—the underlying branching structure is not reflected in evaluation of
sentences. For example, if sentential variables like ‘‘John is meeting Paul in the main square in Warsaw’’
are history-dependent, they might well be meeting at m in history h1 and not meeting at m in history h2
even though h1 and h2 are literally identical up to and long after m. As a result, the question, ‘‘Did John
meet Paul in the main square in Warsaw yesterday?’’ has no straightforward answer. In some histories
leading to the present they did; in some others they did not. It is the case even though these histories
consist of literally the same events up to the present.
The motivation for history dependent valuations is, to a large extent, of a formal nature. Namely, the
respected logical rule of substitution is not valid in models with history-independent valuations. The more
philosophically oriented incentive is that some of the present tense sentences have at least a ‘‘trace of
futurity’’ (Prior 1967, p. 124). The sentences like ‘‘I am having the last cigarette,’’ ‘‘I am choosing to stay
home,’’ or ‘‘Barack Obama is beginning a 4-year term’’ might be quoted as examples. To accommodate
such examples Prior (1967) proposed a syntactic distinction of two types of sentences and Zanardo (1996)
discusses a solution based on the structure of the histories. I agree that such phenomena should be taken
into account, but I still think that the history-independent valuation is a better choice as a first semantic
approximation. To simplify, I am going to think of sentential variables as being, so to say, wholly about
the present.
2 The nomenclature in the field is not homogeneous. What are called histories by some are called routes,
chronicles or branches by others.
3 Some undermine the historical accuracy of the terminology. For a historical argument that the
semantics does not reflect William of Ockham’s original intentions see e.g. Øhrstrøm (1984, p. 217).
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relation for temporal connectives. However, I am going to stick to the standard
terminology and definitions especially since, as shown in (Zanardo 1996, p. 6), any
Ockhamist BT model can be redefined such that it becomes a standard Kripke
model.4
The consequences of our definitions are quite satisfying from the logical
standpoint. The Ockhamist models validate axioms of logic S5 for the purely modal
fragment of our language and of temporal logic of linear time for the purely
temporal fragment of the language. However many philosophers and logicians, as
mentioned earlier, have found these models deficient.
2.2 The Battle Begins
2.2.1 Building the First Trenches: TRL1
Ockhamism proposes a history-dependent semantics which the TRL-ist finds
unacceptable. He grasps the nettle and attempts to provide an alternative semantics
for future contingents. Since he wants to distinguish one of the possible histories,
the very first proposal that comes to mind is to redefine the notion of the model by
adding the information about the existence of the TRL. Here is the first attempt:
Definition 3 (TRL1-model). A TRL1-model M is a quadruple hM;\; TRLh; Vi in
which M, \ and V are used as in Definition 1 and TRLh 2 Hist.
Now, having incorporated the additional parameter into the structure, we can
attempt to get rid of the history parameter (the h on the left-hand side of symbol )
altogether:
Definition 4 (Sentence / is true in TRL1-model M at m).
• M; m p iff m 2 VðpÞ where p 2 Var;
• Natural definitions for truth-functional connectives;
• M; mP/ iff 9m0ðm0\m ^M; m0 /Þ;
• M; mF/ iff 9m0ðm\m0 ^ m0 2 TRLh ^M; m0 /Þ;
• M; m}/ iff 9m0ðm\m0 ^M; m0 /Þ;
• M; mh/ iff 8hðm 2 h ! 9m0ðm0 2 h ^ m\m0 ^M; m0 /ÞÞ.
We need to define } and h separately since they are no longer duals. These
definitions are mimicking the idea of the Peircean sense of operators f and F (cf.
Prior 1967, Ch. 7; Barcellan and Zanardo 1999, p. 3; Belnap et al. 2001, p. 161).
2.2.2 The First Shots: Truth Values Outside the TRL
The crucial objection against the TRL1 is presented in two different manners. First,
Belnap and Green (1994, p. 379) write:
4 Since our notion of valuation differs from that of Zanardo (1996), the redefinition would render the
Ockhamist model a Kripke model based on a particular general frame.
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The coin will come up heads. It is possible, though, that it will come up tails,
and then later (*) it will come up tails again (though at that moment it could
come up heads), and then, inevitably, still later it will come up tails yet again.
The trouble is that at (*) the example says that tails will happen, not merely
that it might, whereas the explanation of the future tense given above
presupposed that the moment of evaluation was in the TRL.
and in (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162) the attack is re-formulated:
We have no trouble with predictions that will be or have been made, but we
have no way of understanding predictions that might have been made. We
have no way of getting a grip on ‘‘Had things gone otherwise, Jack would have
asserted the following: ‘It will (eventually) rain.’’’ Given the context of Jack’s
assertion, the TRL is no longer able to guide us in understanding his reference
to his future.
Formally, the problem comes down to the question of interpretation of sentences
beginning with the connective F at a point m 2 M such that m 62 TRLh. Belnap and
Green (1994, p. 379) write that ‘‘Branching ? TRL has the defect that it gives no
account of the future tense relative to moments that do not lie in the TRLh’’. In fact,
that is not quite right since according to the TRL1 all the future tensed sentences
evaluated outside the TRL are simply false.5 Anyway, it is still a very serious
objection and it was recognized as a fatal one even by the most persistent defenders
of the TRL (see e.g. Brau¨ner et al. 1998). As a result, they decided to reconsider the
notion of the TRL in a way that accounts for predictions at arbitrary evaluation
points of a model.
2.2.3 Battle Lines Re-Drawn: TRL Functions
Having noticed the difficulty raised in the previous section, most of the TRL-ists
decided to reconsider their position in a way that answers the above-mentioned
problem. The generally accepted strategy was to draw a thin red line for every point
of the model (cf. McKim and Davis 1976; Brau¨ner et al. 1998, 2000; Barcellan and
Zanardo 1999; Øhrstrøm 2009), but there were exceptions to this strategy (e.g.
Malpass and Wawer 2012). The drawing was made with the use of the TRL-function
(TRLfcn) which maps moments in M into histories. The function, intuitively
speaking, picks for each moment in a model its actual future. Obviously, not every
function f : M 7!Hist will do. Some constraints must be put on the function for it to
represent the intended idea. First of all, since the function is about to pick the actual
history for a moment, the moment had better be a part of this history. So, the
minimal constraint is the following:
Condition 1 8m 2 M m 2 TRLfcnðmÞ. (McKim and Davis 1976, p. 235).
Let us try to define a new notion of a model:
5 It is by no means the only problem with this semantics. For a short list of non-intuitive validities and
very intuitive non-validities generated by it see (appendix to Malpass and Wawer 2012).
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Definition 5 (TRL2-model). A TRL2-model M is a quadruple hM;\; TRLfcn; Vi in
which M, \ and V are used as in Definition 1 and TRLfcn satisfies Condition 1.
Having added the TRL-function, we can redefine the truth clause for the future
tense operator so it behaves properly over the whole domain. (The rest of the
connectives are interpreted as in Definition 4.)
Definition 6 (F/ is true in TRL2 model M at m).
• M; mF/ iff 9m0ðm\m0 ^ m0 2 TRLfcnðmÞ ^M; m0 /Þ;
This cunning maneuver sets aside one set of worries but does not solve all the
problems.
2.2.4 Gaps in the Lines: Fp ! FFp Fails
It turns out that this general definition of TRLfcn is not completely satisfactory. One
of the most striking deficiencies is the fact that under TRL2 semantics neither of
these two very intuitive sentences: FF/ ! F/ and F/ ! FF/ is valid. In the usual
temporal logic, these sentences define transitivity and density of accessibility
relation respectively. However, under TRL2 semantics they change their usual
meaning and fail for different reasons. Nonetheless, most of us would agree that
those are valid principles so a respectable semantics for temporal logic should
convey this view.
To see that both of the validities fail, consider the following simple TRL2 model
M:¼ hM;\; TRLfcn; Vi such that:
• M = {m1, m2, m3, m4}
• {m1, m2, m3} = h1, {m1, m2, m4} = h2
• m1\m2 ^ m2\m3 ^ m2\m4 ^ m4£m3 ^ m3£m4
• TRLfcn(m1) = h1, TRLfcn(m2) = h2
• m1; m2; m3 62 VðpÞ; m4 2 VðpÞ
We can observe that in this model: M; m1 FFp since M; m2 Fp but M; m1 6
Fp: Therefore FFp ! Fp is not valid. Similarly M; m1 F:p and M; m1 6
FF:p so the converse implication is not valid either.
This consequence is due to the fact that the moments in the tree might not
‘‘accord’’ with respect to their TRLs. As visible in the foregoing example, the source
of trouble is the fact that the TRLs of m1 and m2 are different even though m2 is in
the TRL of m1.
2.2.5 Overzealous Defense: TRLfcn Excludes Branching
One of the ways to cure the aforementioned flaw is to impose an additional
constraint on TRLfcn in order to avoid ‘‘disagreement’’ between moments in the tree.
Belnap and Green (1994) suggested the following move:




Definition 7 (TRL3-model). A TRL3-model M is a quadruple hM;\; TRLfcn; Vi in
which M, \ , and V are used as in Definition 1 and TRLfcn satisfies Conditions 1
and 2.
The problem from the previous section disappears; both FF/ ! F/ and F/ !
FF/ are valid (in any densely ordered frame). Nevertheless, the price is very high.
As a result of Condition 2, we exclude any branching TRL3-models. A very easy
proof is sufficient to establish it:
1. Assume that there is a branching TRL3-model, that is, there are m0; m1; m2 2 M
such that:
(a) m1£m2 and m2£m1, and m1 6¼ m2;
(b) m0 B m1 and m0 B m2;
2. since m0 B m1 and m0 B m2, then by Condition 2, TRLfcn(m0) =
TRLfcn(m1) = TRLfcn(m2). Let TRLfcn(m0) be a history h;
3. by Condition 1, m0; m1; m2 2 h;
4. and by definition of a history as a linearly ordered set we have that m1 \ m2 or
m2 \ m1 or m1 = m2 which contradicts 1(a).
A very similar proof was used by Belnap and Green (1994, p. 380) to establish
the fundamental discrepancy between the idea of a single future and the branching
representation of ontic indeterminism. However, Belnap and Green’s response to
the problems raised in the previous sections is too hasty and one should (and the
TRL-ists did) take more moderate steps in the campaign.
2.2.6 Cautious Defense: TRLfcn Allows Branching
The philosophers and logicians arguing in favor of the TRL acknowledged that the
problems described in Sect. 2.2.4 are serious ones and should be dealt with by
positing some constraints on TRLfcn. Nevertheless, the Condition 2 proposed by
Belnap and Green (1994) is evidently too strong. Is there a middle way that would
cure the aforementioned problems and preserve an indeterministic, tree-like picture?
Yes there is. In fact, it was first noticed long before Belnap and Green raised their
criticism. Already in 1976, McKim and Davis proposed a weaker cousin of
Condition 2 which did not force the deterministic conclusion6.
Condition 3 8m1; m2 2 M ðm1\m2 ^ m2 2 TRLfcnðm1ÞÞ ! TRLfcnðm1Þ ¼ TRLfcn

ðm2ÞÞ. (McKim and Davis 1976, p. 235).
The condition is thought as follows: if a history h is picked as the future of a
given moment m1, then every m2 [ m1 which is in h must confirm m1’s ‘‘choice’’.
Nonetheless, the moments above m1 that are not in h are free to choose otherwise
(unless their antecedents above m1 enforce some choice upon them). Having
introduced the new condition we can slightly reconstruct our TRL-model.
6 A very similar condition was proposed in a different context by Thomason and Gupta (1980).
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Definition 8 (TRL4-model). A TRL4-model M is a quadruple hM;\; TRLfcn; Vi in
which M, \ and V are as in Definition 1 and TRLfcn satisfies Condition 1 and
Condition 3.
Using Condition 3 as a compass we managed to sail between the Charybdis of
determinism and the Scylla of the previously mentioned logical difficulties. Indeed,
the function can be defined with no inconsistency on branching models, the sentence
FF/ ! F/ is valid and F/ ! FF/ is valid in every densely ordered model.
Some authors (e.g. Barcellan and Zanardo 1999; Brau¨ner et al. 1998) considered
one additional and quite natural condition on TRLfcn, namely:
Condition 4 9m 2 M 8m0 m0\m ! TRLfcnðm0Þ ¼ TRLðmÞ
 
Condition 4, together with Conditions 1 and 3, guarantee that one (and only one)
of the histories in the tree is special in a sense that it is picked as the actual one for
every moment in it. It means that all the moments in this history are in accord with
respect to their choice of actual futures: 8m 2 h TRLfcnðmÞ ¼ h. The history h* is
called ‘‘real’’ by Barcellan and Zanardo (1999) and ‘‘normal’’ by Brau¨ner et al.
(1998).
As we shall soon see, it is not the end of the battle. Belnap et al. (2001) have
found their way across the TRL4 trenches and attacked again.
2.2.7 Another Storm: / ! HF/ Fails
Belnap et al. (2001) pointed out that TRL4 is not a foolproof tactic either. The most
important disadvantage is that it fails to validate / ! HF/. This sentence is
considered fundamental by most of the temporal logicians and is usually included
into the axiomatization of the minimal temporal logic. This sentence (and its
counterpart: / ! GP/) guarantees a certain minimal symmetry between past and
future; that is, if a moment m1 is in the past of a moment m2, then m2 is in the future
of m1. This very feature fails under the TRL4 semantics. To see this, let us examine
the following simple example of a model:
• M = {m1, m2, m3}
• {m1, m2} = h1, {m1, m3} = h2
• m1\m2 ^ m1\m3 ^ m2£m3 ^ m3£m2
• TRLfcn(m1) = h1, TRLfcn(m2) = h1, TRLfcn(m3) = h2
• m1; m2 62 VðpÞ; m3 2 VðpÞ
Now, we can easily notice that M; m3 6  p ! HFp. Evidently M; m3  p but
M; m3 6 HFp because Am m \ m3 such that m 6 Fp, namely m1. The bizarre
nature of this consequence is well illustrated by Belnap et al.’s (2001, p. 166)
natural language example, slightly adjusted to the notation of our case. Let m1
happen at 1:00 P.M., m2 and m3 both happen at 2:00 P.M., and let p mean ‘‘The coin
lands tails’’:
Now picture Jack at the moment of use, m3, where the coin landed tails at 2:00
P.M. It would seem that in order to speak truly at m3, Jack would be obliged to
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say ‘‘The coin has landed tails, but this is not what was going to happen at 1:00
P.M. At 1:00 P.M. the coin was going to land heads. It’s just that it didn’t.’’
Another troublesome example found out by Belnap et al. (2001) is that of a
sentence F/ ! hFPF/ which is valid in TRL4 and translated by Belnap et al. into
‘‘That something will happen does indeed imply that it is inevitable that it will be
true that it was going to happen’’ (p. 167). Which is dangerously close to the
deterministic F/ ! hF/ saying that whatever will happen, will happen out of
necessity.
A group of TRL defenders, conscious of these problems, has proposed manifold
strategies meant to repel this storm.
2.2.8 How to Fight?
Don’t budge an inch The first of the tactics is to stick to the TRL4 solution and
somehow explain away the counter-intuitive consequences. For example Barcellan
and Zanardo (1999) appeal to the research in Artificial Intelligence and, in
particular, in Partial Information Reasoning. They argue that TRLfcn can be viewed
as a representation of a course of events which ‘‘best fits suitable criteria like
minimal change principles, probability, typicality and others.’’ (p. 7). Observe that
the ‘‘real’’ history h* is the one that fits the criteria perfectly—it is the history which
develops in the best possible agreement with the criteria.7 However, TRLfcn also tells
us which development of the course of events is the one best fitting the criteria in
any particular situation, even outside h*. Interestingly, in models which TRLfcn
satisfies Condition 4, the sentence / ! HF/ might serve as a test of ‘‘proper
development’’ of a course of events since we have that m 2 h iff M; m/ ! HF/
for an arbitrary valuation function V. So / ! HF/ is valid at m for any m 2 h.
Another rationalization of the failure of / ! HF/ is proposed by Brau¨ner et al.
(2000) where they appeal to the notions of imagination describing scenarios other
than perfect. Their argument goes as follows:
The counter-factual assumption of q does not invalidate the truth of the past
prediction PF:q. If I am awake now, it certainly was true yesterday that I was
going to be awake after one day. The prediction was true (but of course not
necessary) even if I now—while being awake—imagine that I were asleep.
For this reason one might say, that the truth of q ^ PF:q, where q stands for ‘I
am asleep,’ is in fact conceivable. (Brau¨ner et al. 2000, p. 203)
However, it is not their last word since they quickly add that ‘‘ð. . .Þ this piece of
argumentation is somewhat strained’’ (p. 203) and continue to present another
proposal.
Counter-attack: Counter-factual Thin Red Lines Brau¨ner et al. (2000) were
dissatisfied with TRL4 for a couple of reasons. First of all, it did not validate
/ ! HF/ and second, it did not provide the straightforward interpretation of modal
7 Another set of criteria might be Leibnizian simplicity of laws, richness in phenomena, happiness of
minds, maximality of perspectives and then h* simply becomes the best of possible worlds which God
chose to actualize.
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operators (presumably the authors would not be content with the account of h and
} proposed in Definition 4). Therefore, they decided to devise a new TRL semantics
which would deal with these problems.
To this effect, they utilized the concept of TRLfcn described so far and defined the
set of counterfactual TRLs of moment m as follows:
Definition 9 Let TRLfcn: M 7!Hist be a function satisfying Conditions 1, 3 and 4.
The set C(m) of counterfactual branches of a moment m is:
CðmÞ: ¼ fh 2 Histjm 2 h ^ 8m0 [ mðm0 2 h ! TRLfcnðm0Þ ¼ hÞg
Due to Condition 3, TRLfcnðmÞ 2 CðmÞ but the set might be larger. If there are
many elementary possibilities open at m, then C(m) might contain a single
representative from each elementary possibility.8 Brau¨ner et al. (2000) call these
histories ‘‘immediate possibilities’’ of m.
With the notion of counterfactual TRLs at our disposal, we can define new truth
clauses for the connectives in the TRL4-model.
Definition 10 (Sentence / is true in TRL4 model M at m/h). Let M be a TRL4
model. Assume that for every pair m=h; m 2 h 2 CðmÞ, then:
• M; m=h p iff m 2 VðpÞ where p 2 Var;
• Standard definitions for truth-functional connectives;
• M; m=hP/ iff 9m0ðm0\m ^M; m0=h/Þ;
• M; m=hF/ iff 9m0ðm\m0 ^ m0 2 h ^M; m0=h/Þ;
• M; m=h}/ iff 9h0ðh0 2 CðmÞ ^M; m=h0 /Þ.
Operators G, H, and h are duals of F; P; } respectively.
It is easy to see that, given these new clauses, the sentence / ! HF/ is valid and
F/ ! hFPF/ is not. Additionally, we have a clear interpretation of modal
operator } analogous to its Ockhamist interpretation (see Definition 2). Hence
Brau¨ner et al. (2000) achieved the aims they stated but this solution is not without
objections.
The first of these is formulated by Brau¨ner et al. themselves in an observation
that this new semantics invalidates a sentence F}/ ! }F/. To see that it is
problematic consider the following two sentences: (1) ‘‘Tomorrow, I might have
dinner out’’ and (2) ‘‘Necessarily, tomorrow I will stay home’’ According to our new
semantics, (1) and (2) might well be true at the same moment m. To understand this
phenomenon, one needs to keep in mind that the notion of possibility under
discussion is that of ‘‘immediate possibility’’. So even though going out tomorrow is
not among my immediate possibilities at this moment, tomorrow might bring new
immediate possibilities, some of them containing my dining out. What is now
8 The set of elementary possibilities open at moment m is a partition of the set of histories passing
through m, induced by the equivalence relation of ‘being undivided at m’ (&m). h1&m h2 iff m 2
h1 ^ m 2 h2 ^ 9m0 [ mðm0 2 h1 ^ m0 2 h2Þ (See Belnap 2003, p. 19, ff.). For in-depth studies of this and
related notions cf. (Zanardo 1998).
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impossible might become possible in the future. For a more detailed exposition cf.
(Brau¨ner et al. 1998, 2000).
Nonetheless, I believe this approach faces a more important, conceptual
difficulty. It seems to betray the fundamental principles motivating the introduction
of the concept of the TRL. First of all, TRLfcn plays no exceptional role in
interpreting connective F. Notice that TRLfcn(m) is as good as any other h 2 CðmÞ
while interpreting F/ at m. The second, and even more important problem has to do
with re-introduction of a history parameter into our point of evaluation. The
sentences do not have history-independent truth values! Remember that securing
such truth values was one of the main motivations for constructing the TRL
semantics in the first place. The only difference between ‘‘pure’’ Ockhamism and
this version of the TRL is that we introduce a slightly modified notion of possibility.
I think that this was not what all the fuss with the TRL was about. Consequently, I do
not consider this attempt by Brau¨ner et al. to be a promising line of defense of the
notion of the TRL.9
2.3 Lessons of History
As we have seen, the history of the conflict tends to take on a more and more
technically oriented dimension. This process has begun when the weapon of the
TRL-function was first introduced. It was designed to defend against the very first
challenge, which was to provide the semantic treatment of sentences evaluated
outside the TRL. The supporters of the TRL accepted this criticism in full generality.
At this point, they agreed to leave the safely guarded Thin Red Line. Nonetheless,
their situation in the open field is much more difficult. As we have seen, they need to
provide more and more elaborate notions of the TRL to counter the formal
objections that arise. At the same time the attackers can safely rest on the intuitive
logical features of Ockhamism, and wait for the opponent to wave the white flag.
I believe that an unconditional acceptance of the initial argument was a mistake.
It was a trap which broke the solid defenders’ ranks. My piece of advice to a TRL-ist
is to be patient and to dig his heels into the initially drawn, firm red line of defense.
The details of this advice are outlined in the following sections.
3 The Thin Red Line Reconsidered
My conception of the Thin Red Line is substantially different to those discussed
above. Most notably, I dispose of TRLfcn altogether and I use the distinction between
contexts and possible moments to express the new solution. Before I clarify the
distinction and present my proposal, let me recall the fundamental desiderata which
every TRL theory aims to satisfy. First, it intends to provide a semantic treatment of
9 In Brau¨ner et al. 1998 had proposed yet another version of the TRL semantics. It is technically more
sophisticated than the one presented in this section. In particular, they evaluate sentences at pairs m/
TRLfcn rather than m/h. However, in the evaluation of sentences, TRLfcn plays the exact formal role that
the history parameter does in the just described semantics. Consequently, the aforementioned objections
apply mutatis mutandis to this earlier theory of Brau¨ner et al.
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future contingents such that every prediction is ascribed one of the two truth values
(while by a prediction, I mean a use of a future-tensed sentence). Second, the theory
does not want to appeal to the history parameter or relativize to the context of
assessment while ascribing the truth value. Thirdly, it aims to avoid the
deterministic conclusion that every truth about the future is a necessary truth.
Finally, it needs to answer the entire list of objections raised by Belnap et al. (2001).
I believe that my solution pays due attention to all the above-mentioned tasks.
I intend to follow MacFarlane’s (2003) terminology and distinguish semantics
proper from postsemantics. I introduce an additional notion of presemantics and
then define and defend the theory of the TRL as a certain combination of
presemantic, semantic, and postsemantic assumptions.
3.1 Truth at a Point of Evaluation and Truth at a Context
Semantics proper is primarily concerned with the truth value of a sentence at a given
point of evaluation. The semantics proper for branching time that I am going to
accept is Ockhamism, outlined in Definition 2, in which the appropriate point of
evaluation of a sentence is a triple hM; m=hi (where M ¼ hM;\; Vi and m 2 h). I
chose this semantics proper mainly because it generates the acceptable set of
validities and it neatly combines the ordinary temporal logic of linear time with the
notion of historical possibility.10 Another advantage of this semantics is that it can
be easily fused with a variety of different postsemantics. Hereafter, if I speak simply
about semantics, I mean semantics proper.
However, the semantics proper operates on a quite high level of abstraction; it
deals with truth values of sentences at points of evaluation. For a more down-to-
earth application of a semantic theory, we need to specify how to relate the
particular use of a sentence at a context to the semantic interpretation of this very
sentence.11 The semantics answers whether a sentence is true at a given point of
evaluation but it does not tackle the issue if a sentence is true while used at a given
context. The distinction of two notions of truth which I use here is MacFarlane’s
(2008, p. 83). Belnap et al. (2001) stick to a single notion of truth, but they
distinguish between embedded and stand-alone sentences for similar purposes.
In my opinion, the problem of future contingents is about truth values of
contingent predictions—future tensed assertive speech acts. Consequently, it is the
truth value of a sentence used at a context rather than the truth value of a sentence at
a point of evaluation which is the primary object of controversy. The notion of truth
at a point of evaluation is, in a sense, an auxiliary concept which helps us to
10 However, the logical properties of the Ockhamist structures are much more complicated than one
might initially expect. For example, the task of modal axiomatization of this class of structures has proved
to be a very difficult one. For the latest attempt, see (Reynolds 2003).
Some logicians, like Nishimura (1979) or Øhrstrøm and Hasle (1995) believe that Ockhamism
validates some counter-intuitive sentences. For this reason it should be replaced by another semantics.
Other authorities (Thomason 1984; Belnap et al. 2001) think otherwise, but this is a whole new issue only
remotely connected with the problem of future contingents.
11 A use of a sentence might be thought of as an idealization of a speech act. I follow Belnap et al.’s
terminology and write about uses of sentences. For similar purposes, Kaplan (1989b) coined a technical
term, ‘‘occurrence,’’ while MacFarlane (2003) exploits a term ‘‘utterance.’’
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understand our use of a language (a similar view was defended by MacFarlane 2003,
p. 329). It is the reason why I think that there is no need to change the Ockhamist
semantics proper as long as it generates intuitive validities and accurately models
the temporal notion of possibility. The proper solution to the problem of future
contingents should be focused mostly on the accurate analysis of the use of a
prediction at a given context and this is what I am going to investigate.
Since the notion of context is so crucial, let us spare a few words explaining its
role. Kaplan (1989b) observes that the context of use of a sentence is of cardinal
importance in the proper analysis of our linguistic practice for at least two reasons.
First, it is essential in a proper understanding of indexical expressions like ‘‘I’’,
‘‘here’’, ‘‘now’’, etc. Kaplan (1989b) spends most of his effort unfolding the details
of semantic treatment of indexical expressions, but he believes that the context has a
‘‘more fundamental role, a role that would be required even if the language
contained no indexicals,’’ (1989a, p. 595) which he describes as ‘‘designating’’ and
which is then stressed and explained as ‘‘initializing’’ in (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 148).
Consider, for example, the sentence ‘‘It is raining.’’ Some philosophers (e.g.
Twardowski 1900) have considered such sentences incomplete unless the place and
date (maybe possible world as well) are explicitly specified. Others (see Prior 1967)
took such sentences to be perfectly complete but evaluated in various circum-
stances, on different occasions of use. The appropriate circumstances of evaluation
are ‘‘provided’’ (or designated, or initialized) by a context of use of a sentence.
Since different contexts provide different circumstances, two uses of the same
sentence might have different truth values (even though the truth value of a sentence
in given circumstances do not change in time). The two notions of truth might be
systematically related as follows: a use of a sentence at a context is true iff the
sentence is true in the circumstances provided by the context of use.
Let me introduce some notation: I write M; c/ to indicate that a use of
sentence / is true at context c, in a model M. Sometimes, I express the same idea
with a phrase: sentence / is true as used at context c. The notion of truth at a context
ðÞ should be carefully distinguished from the notion of truth at a point of
evaluation ðÞ which is reserved for semantics proper. As noted, one of the major
roles of the context is to initialize the process of evaluation—for a given use of a
sentence, the context determines the moment of the model at which the process of
evaluation of the sentence begins. Following Belnap et al. I call this role
‘‘initialization’’ and model it by a function I which is a map from the set of all
contexts C to the set of moments of the model M.
However, to know the moment at which to start the evaluation process might not
be sufficient to assess a use of a sentence. We need to relate the notion of truth at a
context to the semantic notion of truth at a point of evaluation more specifically; i.e.
one needs to know not only when, but also how to assess the sentences used. We
shall see that no answer to any of these questions is completely uncontroversial. In
the conceptual framework which I propose, I deal with these two issues separately.
The first is in the domain of what I call presemantics and the second is studied
by postsemantics. The more detailed proposals are developed in the next two
sections.
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3.2 Presemantics and the TRL
The novelty of my proposal consists in the introduction of an element which I call
presemantics. To understand what presemantics is concerned with, we should first
comprehend what the context of a use of a sentence is. I am going to think of the
context as a set of circumstances that accompany the use of the sentence, e.g. the
place, the time, the speaker, and the addressee of the use of the sentence. All of
these are in fact ‘‘pieces of reality’’ surrounding the event of a use of a sentence. I
share this view with Kaplan (1989a) and Belnap et al. (2001):
The contexts ð. . .Þ are metaphysical, not cognitive. (Kaplan 1989a, p. 597).
The agent, time, and place are all drawn from the world. (Kaplan 1989a, p.
591, emphasis mine).
Assignments ð. . .Þ have no fact-of-the-matter parameter as do the pure
indexicals and true demonstratives. (Kaplan 1989a, p. 593, emphasis mine)
You can reasonably decide to treat ‘‘now’’ and ‘‘here’’ as context-dependent,
but that is because there is in fact a time of use and a place of use. (Belnap
et al. 2001, p. 148)
Since the notion of the context has this ‘‘fact-of-the-matter’’ character, the
accepted set of contexts C and the structure of this set is a partial indicator of
metaphysical presuppositions. After all, a use of a sentence (an idealization of a
speech act) is a concrete event in our world, and a context consists of concrete
circumstances that accompany this event. Therefore, I assume that postulating and
using certain contexts in the semantic theory is tantamount to the metaphysical
commitment to their concrete existence. The purpose of presemantics is to
explicate, at least partially, the implicit metaphysical assumptions which are
smuggled into the discussion with the notion of the context. On the formal level, this
explication is performed in two steps. First, we postulate a set of accessible contexts
C ordered by temporal succession relation . Second, we decide which possible
moments should be initialized by accessible contexts (we decide on the shape of
function I).12
The prevailing presemantic assumptions accepted, often tacitly, by the theorists
in the field are that
12 It is important to stress that not necessarily, at every c 2 C, someone uses a sentence. The concept of
an accessible context is more extensive. For example, no-one is situated next to me, so the place and time
next to me is not actually a context of use of a sentence; however, they are a part of an accessible context.
In general, I think of a set of conditions to be an accessible context of use if there is at least time and space
(and probably some matter as well), so if we added a speaker or writer, the sentence would be used.
Sometimes, for stylistic reasons, I drop the adjective ‘‘accessible’’. Kaplan (1989b) sometimes calls such
circumstances possible contexts (p. 523) or possible occasions of use (p. 494) but usually refers to them
simply as contexts. I decided to use the notion of accessibility to avoid confusion with historical
possibility.
My arguments can be easily rephrased if one insists on thinking of a context of use as conditions in
which a sentence is actually being used. To do so, one would need to replace each subsequent appearance
of a sign ‘I[C] = ’ with ‘I½C ’ and ‘C = ’ with ‘C ’. However, I believe that this mode of




(a) I is the identity function, that is 8c 2 C IðcÞ ¼ c;
(b) I[C] = M, where M is a set of possible moments13.
This approach seems to be implicitly assumed by Thomason (1970) and MacFarlane
(2003, 2008), and is almost explicitly stated by Belnap et al. (2001). I will call these
assumptions ‘‘branching concretism’’ to stress Belnap et al.’s metaphysical view
which gives rise to them. The authors think of possible moments as causally ordered
concrete events which, in toto, constitute our world (cf. Belnap et al. 2001,
pp. 139–140, 178–181, in particular: ‘‘a moment is an instantaneous concrete
event’’). The presemantic assumptions (a) and (b) naturally ensue from such
metaphysical vision. If we accept that possible moments are concrete entities making
up the world, it is natural to think of them as accessible contexts of use of sentences.
However, branching concretism does not seem to be the obligatory option. We can
negate either of the branching concretist assumptions. Let us first focus on (a). We can
abandon this formally handy identification by providing an alternative metaphysical
account of possibility. There is a persistent line of thought which insists that
possibilities do not consist of—contrary to Belnap et al.’s assumption—concrete
entities. This idea was famously, though casually, advocated in (Kripke 1980). The
author presents his views discussing the example of throwing a pair of dice:
Hence there are thirty-six possible states of the pair of dice, as far as the
numbers shown face-up are concerned, though only one of these states
corresponds to the way the dice actually will come up. ð. . .Þ Now the ‘actual
world’ in this case is the state of the dice that is actually realized. Another
entity, more ‘concrete’ than this state, is the Lesniewskian-Goodmanian
physical entity which is the ‘sum’ of the two dice. This complex physical entity
(‘the dice,’ thought of as a single object) is before me on the table, after the
throw, and its actual position determines the actual state of the (two) dice. But
when we talk in school of thirty-six possibilities, in no way do we need to posit
that there are some thirty-five other entities, existent in some never-never land,
corresponding to the physical object before me. ð. . .Þ The thirty-six possibil-
ities, the one that is actual included, are (abstract) states of the dice, not
complex physical entities.ð. . .Þ
‘Possible worlds’ are little more than the miniworlds of school probability
blown large. ð. . .Þ ‘Possible worlds’ are total ‘ways the world might have
been’, or states or histories of the entire world. ð. . .Þ
The ‘actual world’—better, the actual state, or history of the world—should
not be confused with the enormous scattered object that surrounds us. The
latter might also have been called ‘the (actual) world’ ð. . .Þ. Thus the possible
but not actual worlds are not phantom duplicates of the ‘world’ in this other
sense. (Kripke, 1980, p. 16–20).
The intuition behind this quote is that possibilities (possible worlds, moments, or
histories) are not—in contrast to our world—concrete. This general insight was
developed in plenitude of different directions in the discussion over the accurate
13 The symbol I[C] denotes the the image of set C through the function I; that is I½C: ¼ fxj9c 2 C such
that I(c) = x}.
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interpretation of the possible worlds discourse. Some of the proposals are quite
evidently inadequate for our general purpose, which is to model metaphysical
indeterminism. Clearly, identifying possible moments with works of fiction (a` la
Rosen 1990), or mental acts (a view discussed by Rescher 1975) would not establish
them as appealing foundations for ontic indeterminism. Belnap et al. (2001, p. 179)
argue that entities of fundamentally ‘linguistic’ character, such as maximal and
consistent sets of sentences (e.g. Carnap 1947), would not give ontic indeterminism
its due either.
Nonetheless, there are specimens of possible worlds theories which are more
likely to encompass the realist intuition about possibilities while rejecting their
concrete existence. They are sometimes classified as actualist(ic) modal realism
(e.g. Chihara 1998; Divers 2002). In the course of the debate over the status of
possible worlds, many such conceptions were developed. Probably the best known
and most influential are those which construe possible worlds as: maximal possible
states of affairs (e.g. Plantinga 1970, 1974, 1987), sets of basic particular situations
(Cresswell 1972), ways things might have been (understood as properties or states in
Stalnaker 1976), maximal consistent sets of language independent propositions
(Adams 1974), world propositions (Fine 1977), or complex structural universals
(Bigelow and Pargetter 1990). Belnap et al. (2001) decided to endorse the branching
concretism position, but we need to be aware that it is not the unique conception at
our disposal.
I do not want to defend nor develop any of the aforementioned, actualist
attempts. My intention is to generalize the branching-time formalism to allow for
the distinction, fundamental for the actualists, between concretely existing chunks
of physical reality and possible moments which represent reality but need not be
identified with it. Therefore, I will assume in what follows that appealing to possible
moments, in contrast with accessible context, does not bring the commitment to
their concrete existence.14
The parameter C encodes all the accessible contexts of use which are concrete
parts of the world. Therefore, it can be naturally associated with Kripke’s notion of
‘the (actual) world’—‘‘the ‘concrete’ Lesniewskian-Goodmanian phisical entity’’ or
‘‘the enormous scattered object that surrounds us.’’ (This formal paraphrase of
Kripke’s idea is backed by some remarks of Kaplan, e.g. ‘‘[A]n actual-world is
simply the circumstance of a context of use.’’ 1989a, p. 596.) The set M stands for
possible moments—the possible states of the world, which need not be identified
with concrete events and contexts. Thanks to my formal apparatus we can
disentangle these two notions, reject the concretist’s assumption (a) and claim, in
the actualist’s manner, that C \ I[C] = ;. The formalism itself does not favor either
branching concretism or branching actualism, but it enables one to express both of
them. We shall see that various views on the relation of contexts and possible
moments might help one to understand the debate on the status of the TRL.
14 It is important to stress that the abstract nature of possible moments does not detach them from the
reality. Nor does it imply that the branching structure of possibilities is arbitrary or independent from the
features of the real objects. I am inclined to believe that the exact form of the tree of possibilities is
determined by the modal aspects of our concrete world and properties of objects existing in it. However, it
is a further, complex issue which I will not discuss in this paper.
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If we abandond the branching concretist assumption (a), it seems that it is no
longer so controversial to reject (b). The claim (b) states that I[C] = M which
means that every possible moment is initialized by some accessible context of use.
Our view on the nature of possible moments might crucially influence our opinion in
this respect. In the branching concretist picture, every context initializes a single
possible moment, namely itself. However, if we consider possible moments to be
representations of concrete reality, we need to decide which possible moment
should be initialized by a given context. The most natural claim is: the one which
represents the context accurately. As a result, if our physical world is not tree-
shaped but its possibilities are, then not every possible moment is initialized.
Consequently, if we distinguish the metaphysical status of utterances and their
contexts from the status of possible worlds/moments/histories, we might be willing
to differentiate among possibilities. Some of them are initialized by uses of
sentences and some are not.
Thanks to the concepts of initialization (I) and accessible contexts (C) we gain a
subtle tool for expressing some of the metaphysical presuppositions. Different
assumptions about the structure of the world have various consequences in the
accepted presemantics. Let us now set the new concepts to work and sketch a few
presemantic possibilities:
Branching concretism I[C] = M = C. As I said, it seems to be the view most
commonly held among theorists in the field. According to such view, our world is a
tree-like structure.
Presentism card(C) = 1, I[C] = {m}, where m 2 M. There is only one moment
at which sentences can be used, because there is only one moment—the present
moment (represented by the single c 2 C). It is an open question whether c = m or
not (see the discussion of the status of TRLh below).
Growing Block Universe There is an isomorphism between C and GBmp ¼ fm 2
Mjmmp; for a chosen mp 2 Mg and I[C] = GBmp .15 GBmp represents the part of
the universe that has grown until the present, which is represented by mp. One might
argue that this representation does not grasp the ‘‘dynamic’’ nature of the growth, in
which case it should be seen as a snapshot of the growth at the moment when mp is
on the top. Again, I remain neutral whether we should identify C with GBmp .
Thin Red Line There is an isomorphism between C and a single h 2 Hist and
I[C] = h. Intuitively, C is the physical, non-branching world that we live in, and h is
the Thin Red Line, the possible history which is actualized; I shall call it TRLh.
The formalism is neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of TRLh. In
particular, we do not need to identify it with C. As I argued, if we assent to some
actualist realist notion of possibility it is very natural to claim that C \ TRLh = ;
(after all, if actualized possible moments are abstract states, they are not identical to
concrete contexts). If TRLh is an abstract representation of the world, it is
metaphysically on a par with all other possibilities; it just happens to represent the
world as it actually is. Nonetheless, we can decide to metaphysically differentiate
TRLh from other histories and assume that C = TRLh. However, we need to be
careful since such metaphysical distinction might suggest a camouflaged form of
15 More precisely, an isomorphism holds between hGBmp ; i and hC;i:
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ontic determinism. At the end of the day, it is the claim that among all the histories,
only TRLh concretely exists. One might try to argue, however, that even given that
C = TRLh, we can avoid a deterministic conclusion. To this end, we can appeal to
the conception of possibility developed by Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996). They are
concentrated on possibilia rather than possible worlds or moments but we can apply
their general idea. According to this view, all the possible moments (M) actually
exist. However, only a part of them (TRLh) concretely exist and the rest is actual but
abstract. To diminish the deterministic concern, one can argue, following the
authors, that TRLh is only contingently concrete and other histories are contingently
abstract. We are tempted to derive the deterministic conclusion out of the different
metaphysical status only if we believe (unjustifiably, according to the authors) that
being concrete is an essential feature of concrete objects and being abstract of the
abstract ones. If we dispose of this alleged prejudice, we can safely identify our
concrete world with TRLh. Such a solution would accept the concretist’s assumption
(a) but reject (b). Apparently, it is harder to justify the acceptance of (b) combined
with the rejection of (a).
The Thin Red Line position, as I see it, is a conjunction of a couple of
metaphysical claims: (1) the physical world which we inhabit is not branching (the
world is represented by C linearly ordered by );16 (2) every moment in this world
exists in the very same way (eternalism); (3) this world might be different than it
actually is, so it is not deterministic (the possibilities of this world, encoded by M,
branch). As a result, my TRL-ist has a quite different stance on the status of time and
possibility. On the one hand, the world has concrete, temporal parts. On the other, it
does not have analogous concrete, modal parts since only one of the possible
histories is realized. Belnap et al. (2001, p. 179) conjecture that such a metaphysical
view has its origins in both classical and relativistic physics. However, since it was
held already by medieval theologians, it must have had another source of
motivation—probably in the notion of atemporal, divine knowledge.
Presemantics is an important aspect of my TRL theory. It will be used to provide
a bivalent treatment of future contingents. To this end, we need to endow model M
(Definition 1) with some bit of presemantic information. Let me just add the two
elements discussed so far as elements of the model, so a model M becomes a
quintuple hM;\; V ; C; Ii. To specify which presemantics the model M is supplied
with, I will use appropriate subscripts: MBC for branching concretist presemantics,
MPRES for presentist, and MTRL for TRL-ist. The addition of these elements to the
model does not affect the semantic proper interpretation of the connectives
introduced in Definition 2, i.e. hM;\; V ; C; Ii; m=h/ iff hM;\; Vi; m=h/.
3.3 Postsemantics and the TRL
Postsemantics builds on presemantics and semantics proper to give an account of
how to apply the notions of context, initialization and point of evaluation to assess
16 We need to remember that the idea of time which we entertain here is a prerelativistic one.
Consequently, we can freely speak about events in time being linearly ordered by temporal relations.
However, to adopt to a more contemporary physics, we would need to say that hC i is isomorphic to a
Minkowki spacetime (special relativity) or to a differentiable manifold (general relativity).
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our utterances. In postsemantics, we can finally study the concept of truth of a use of
sentence / at context c, in model M. I will describe several proposals discussed in
the literature and introduce my own TRL postsemantics in contrast. I use the
superscripts over a sign  to differentiate among definitions of truth-at-the-context.
For each of the Definitions 11–14, the moment of evaluation on the right-hand
side of the equivalence is called a context-initialized moment.
Definition 11 Supervaluationism M; c SUP/ iff M; IðcÞ=h/ for every h such
that IðcÞ 2 h.
The supervaluationist takes a use of a sentence to be true if the sentence is true at
each history passing through the context-initialized moment. Therefore, one can
truly use a sentence / if and only if one can truly use h/. Interestingly, the fact that
a use of a sentence is not true does not imply that the use of its negation is true. For
some sentences and contexts, neither a use of the sentence nor its negation is true.
For exposition and a more detailed analysis of supervaluationism in the context of
BT, see (Thomason 1970). For a, TRL-friendly version of supervaluationism see
(Malpass and Wawer 2012).
Definition 12 Relativism: M; c; ca  REL/ iff M; IðcÞ=h/ for every history h
such that h 2 HIðcÞjIðcaÞ. (The symbol Hm1jm2 denotes Hm1 \ Hm2 if m1 \ m2 and Hm1
otherwise.)
It is a generalization of supervaluational semantic. It adds another aspect to the
context—a moment of a context of assessment (ca) of a sentence used at c. For a
detailed exposition and motivation of this novel idea see (MacFarlane 2003, 2008).
Definition 13 Conservatism: M; c=hCON/ iff M; IðcÞ=h/.
This theory simply refuses to assess the truth value of a sentence used at context c
unless the history of evaluation is specified. For example, Belnap et al. (2001) argue
that a use of the sentence like ‘‘The summer will be hot’’ is analogous to a use of the
sentence ‘‘x is white.’’ In both cases, we cannot assess if they are true, as used at
context c, unless we provide some additional information. In the latter case, we need
to specify the assignment of a free variable and in the former, the history of
evaluation (see Belnap et al. 2001, p. 155, semantic thesis 6–6). In general, to assess
if a use of a sentence at a context is true, we need to have all the information
necessary to evaluate the sentence at the context-initialized moment of evaluation.
In particular, we need to know with respect to which model, which moment, which
assignment of free variables and which history we should evaluate a sentence. The
context provides a lot of the required information but, as Belnap et al. urge, it
provides neither an assignment of free variables nor a history. However, if we
supplement the information provided by the context with additional data, we can
ascribe the truth value to a use of a sentence.17 For an inventive, recent fusion of
supervaluationism and conservatism see (Placek 2011).
17 Belnap et al.’s terminology differs from mine at this point. When I write about a use of a sentence
being true at a context, the authors write about a stand-alone sentence being true at a context-initialized
point of evaluation.
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I call this position conservatism since it preserves as much semantics as possible,
including the history parameter, while shifting to postsemantics. Most of the
alternative views came out of the conviction that predictive speech acts, such as ‘‘The
summer will be hot,’’ should be assessed with no resort to the history parameter. To this
effect, a supervaluationist simply takes into account all the histories passing through
the context-initialized moment; a relativist considers all the histories containing the
context of assessment; and a TRL-ist evaluates with respect to a single, ‘‘red’’ history.
Definition 14 Thin Red Line: MTRL; cTRL/ iff MTRL; IðcÞ=TRLh /.
A use of a sentence is true at context c if and only if the sentence is true at a moment
initialized by c, at the history which corresponds to the actual course of events.
This postsemantics, combined with Ockhamist semantics and TRL-presemantics,
guarantees exactly what was intended. On the one hand, for every sentence /,
including a future contingent, and every context of use c, either the sentence or its
negation is true as used at c. At this point, the TRL position differs from
supervaluationism and relativism, which accept truth value gaps for some sentences,
used at some contexts. On the other hand, contrary to Belnap et al.’s conservative
position, every use of a future contingent can be assessed as true or false with no
specification of a history parameter. The process of evaluation of the sentences
begins, by default, at the history which corresponds to our world.
Interestingly, one of the recent remarks on the TRL theory made by Øhrstrøm and
Hasle (2011) might be seen as a TRL-postsemantics for branching concretist
presemantics. Their idea, translated to my notation would be that MBC; cTRL/ iff
MBC; IðcÞ=TRLfcnðIðcÞÞ/. To use this postsemantics, we would need to enrich the
notion of the model by the addition of TRLfcn which, under this new reading, can be
most naturally thought of as a function assigning a future to every context of use of
a sentence—the history of a context of use. However, this idea is mentioned only in
passing in (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2011) so it is hard to find out the authors’ exact
intentions behind their definition.18
4 Answering Objections
4.1 Logical Objections
As we have seen in Sect. 2, there were numerous attempts to prove the TRL theory
logically faulty. I will first confront my solution with the most natural worry and
then I will show that it is to a large extent immune to this sort of trouble.
4.1.1 A Simple Case
One might claim that the TRL theory presented here is just a version of the TRL1
discussed in Sect. 2.2.1, that is, a theory that singles out a unique history and closely
18 I would like to thank Peter Øhrstrøm for drawing my attention to this recent idea and making the
manuscript of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘‘Future Contingents’’ available to me.
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ties the interpretation of the ‘‘It will be the case’’ (F) connective with this very
history. It is partly right, so let me reconsider the criticism of this particular version
of the TRL theory presented in Sect. 2.2.2.
The objection naturally splits into two, the more abstract one and the more
specific which asks for interpretation of particular sentences of natural language.
The latter derives from the former which I will confront first. It is phrased as
follows: ‘‘Branching ? TRL has the defect that it gives no account of the future
tense relative to moments that do not lie on TRL’’ (Belnap and Green 1994, p. 379).
In the framework, we are working with, the question is ambiguous since it
contains the word ‘‘moments’’. We need to carefully distinguish moments of context
from moments of evaluation. These two notions are co-extensive for branching
concretist, but might diverge in other presemantics. In general, the strength of the
argument crucially depends on which of the meanings we have in mind. If
‘‘moments’’ refers to moments of evaluation, it is a fair objection; any respectable
semantics should provide some reasonable interpretation of a language at every
point of evaluation; TRL1 does not do it, hence it is not acceptable. Observe that my
version of the TRL theory does not face this difficulty since it utilizes a decent
Ockhamist semantics which provide a (history-dependent) treatment of every
sentence at every point of evaluation. However, if the word ‘‘moments’’ in the quote
refers to moments of context of speech acts, it is by far an objection that begs the
question since it presupposes branching concretism (all possible moments are
accessible contexts of use) and then demands a proper analysis of speech acts being
made at all possible moments.19 This is exactly where the TRL-ist should object by
saying that speech acts are concrete events and they happen in our world only and
our world is not a branching structure.
Now, let us turn to the examples of sentences which TRL theory is supposed to be
unable to interpret:
The coin will come up heads. It is possible, though, that it will come up tails,
and then later (*) it will come up tails again (though at that moment it could
come up heads), and then, inevitably, still later it will come up tails yet again.
(Belnap and Green 1994).
The sentence might be naturally translated into the formal language to Fp ^
}Fðq ^ }Fp ^ Fðq ^hFqÞÞ (where p means ‘‘The coin is landing heads’’ and
q means ‘‘The coin is landing tails’’). Now, we can apply our TRL theory to evaluate
this particular prediction made at a given context. The TRL postsemantics proposed
in Definition 14 (p. 23), the presemantic assumptions made at page 21, and semantic
transformations described in Definition 2 (p. 5) guarantee a very non-controversial
result. (I leave to the inquisitive reader the straightforward, but rather laborious
computation.) I should stress that the procedure provides very natural truth
conditions for sentences evaluated in or out of TRLh. Sentences are used in the
actual world only, but the content of these sentences might appeal to various
possible circumstances and we have a natural way to ascribe truth values to
sentences in these circumstances.
19 In (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162) the authors specify that they mean moments of context of use indeed.
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Let us now consider the second example:
Had things gone otherwise, Jack would have asserted the following ‘It will
(eventually) rain.’ Given the context of Jack’s assertion, the TRL is no longer
able to guide us in understanding his reference to his future. (Belnap et al.
2001, p. 162)
This one is much more demanding. The authors use a counterfactual construction
to move the point of evaluation away from the context at which the initial sentence
was used. Then, they quote Jack’s (possible) assertion made at the switched
evaluation point and ask about the interpretation of this assertion at the switched
point. To give an appropriate semantic treatment of such examples of direct speech,
Belnap et al. (2001, p. 174) and Belnap (2002, p. 44) devised the operators which
shift the context of use in the process of evaluation (the operators they propose are
‘‘a asserts ‘A’’’ and ‘‘Truly utters(t1, t2, ‘A’)’’ respectively).
20 In particular, the
context of use might be shifted to some unactualized circumstance. This idea is
perfectly consistent with branching concretism, but it conflicts with the TRL theory
since the latter states that there are no contexts besides those which initialize
moments on TRLh.
Especially interesting cases of direct speech, in context of our discussion, are
possible predictions. For example, even though I have not just used the sentence ‘‘I
will eat dinner soon,’’ I really could, as the TRL-ist is happy to admit, have used the
sentence just now (e.g. to inform my wife who is sitting next to me). So far, we
understand when a use of a sentence is true at a context, but what does it mean for a
possible use to be true? Formally speaking, we need to provide some analysis of the
construction ‘‘a truly uses ‘/’ ’’ or similar. A part of the task of such analysis is to
provide the truth conditions for conditionals like: ‘‘Had things gone otherwise, I
would have truly used the sentence ‘I will eat dinner soon.’’’21
Belnap et al.’s objection suggests that a correct analysis is out of range of the
TRL-ist due to the shortage of contexts. It seems to me, however, that the authors’
context-shifting technique is not the only way to understand such phrases. An
alternative idea is to construct a translation /t of a possibly-used sentence / such
that any sentence wt, used at TRL-acceptable context c has the same truth conditions
as w, where wt is a sentence in which every appearance of ‘‘a truly uses ‘/’ ’’ is
replaced by /t. One needs to be very careful in this process, especially coping with
indexical expressions in /. However, I believe this procedure to be available even
for such indexically loaded, possibly used sentences as: ‘‘I will actually talk to you
tomorrow.’’ Consequently, the project which would give account of the truth values
20 Technically speaking, Kaplan (1989b, p. 511) would call such operators monsters, but the analysis
gives desirable results and the authors stress that ‘‘in any case, better a monster than a fog’’ (Belnap et al.
2001, p. 174), which I find a decent maxim.
21 Evidently, we would need to appeal to some treatment of conditionals in BT. However, it is an
independent project, to a large extent external to the problem discussed here. Interestingly, even though
Belnap et al. use a counterfactual construction phrasing their objection, they do not propose any
semantics for such connectives. However, there are some initial studies of counterfactuals in the context
of BT (e.g. Thomason and Gupta 1980; Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995; Placek and Mu¨ller 2007) and they can
be readily applied to our semantics.
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of possible uses of sentences within the TRL setting is not, in principle, doomed to
failure. I acknowledge that it is a very important open problem and it needs to be
solved for the TRL theory, as presented here, to be adequate. However, I am not
going to tackle it at this juncture.
4.1.2 The General Case
The aim of this section is to show that the TRL solution that I propose is in fact
semantically equivalent to the conservative proposal of Belnap et al. (2001). It
means that the set of truths generated by both these semantics are exactly the same.
As a result, no logical objection of the sort presented in Sect. 2 applies to the TRL
theory proposed by me. The theory is simply immune to the ‘‘logical attacks.’’
To proceed with the process of comparison (and differentiation) of the theories, I
need to introduce a few general semantic definitions. So far, the only notions we
were concerned with were the truth of a sentence at a point of evaluation and the
truth of a use of a sentence at a context. Since we use two parallel notions of truth (
and ), the process of generalization is also twofold. We have already seen what it
means for a sentence to be true at a point of evaluation M; m=h in Definition 2. Let
me introduce some generalizations of :
Definition 15 (Truth in a model M). Let M ¼ hM;\; V; C; Ii be a model and / a
sentence of our language. The sentence / is true in the model M ðM/Þ iff
M; m=h/ for arbitrary m 2 M and h 2 Hist such that m 2 h.
Belnap et al. (2001, p. 236) calls this notion validity in model M.
Definition 16 (Truth in a structure F). Let F ¼ hM;\i be a BT structure and / a
sentence. Then, we say that / is true in F ðF/Þ iff for every model M based on
F; M/.
Belnap et al. (2001, p. 236) calls this notion F-validity.
Definition 17 (Ockhamist truth). A sentence / is Ockhamist true iff F/ for
arbitrary BT structure F.
Very closely related notions are called LD-validity by Kaplan (1989b, p. 547) and
logical necessity by MacFarlane (2008, p.84).
We can now introduce the parallel generalizations associated with the concept of
truth at a context. I already defined what it means for a use of sentence / to be true
at context c, in model M (Definitions 11–14). Even though the predictions differ
depending on the accepted postsemantics, we can wave these differences aside in
the unified postsemantic definitions:
Definition 18 (Valid in a model M). Sentence / is valid in model M ¼
hM;\; V; C; Ii iff M; c/ for every c 2 C.
Belnap et al. (2001, p. 237) call it in-context validity in M. Keep in mind though,
that Belnap et al.’s postsemantics require them to add a history parameter to every
moment of a context of use.
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Definition 19 (Valid in a BT-structure F). We say that sentence / is valid in
structure F ¼ hM;\i ðF/Þ iff M/ for any M based on F.
Belnap et al. (2001, p. 237) call it in-context validity in F. The definition can be
naturally generalized to classes of frames and all BT frames (MacFarlane 2008, p.
84, describes it as the logical truth).
I follow in my notation Kaplan (1989b) and generalize validity from truth at a
context. By the same token, I diverge from the common usage of a concept of
validity as a generalization of a notion of truth at an evaluation point. Observe,
however, that the distinction between truth at a context and truth at a point of
evaluation is not, for the most part, introduced in formal modal logic.
With this apparatus at hand, we can begin a comparison of logics of different
theories. The first, simple but important, observation is that C and I have no impact
on our semantics proper so far, they reveal their effect only in postsemantics.
Consequently, we can state the following fact:
Fact 1 For any two models M ¼ hM;\;V ; C; Ii and N ¼ hM;\; V ; C0; I0i, any
sentence /, any m 2 M, and any h 2 Hist:
M; m=h/ iff N; m=h/
Proof By straightforward induction on complexity of /. h
This observation basically says that no matter which presemantics and
postsemantics you choose, you will not notice any difference in truth values of
the sentences at points of evaluation. This fact easily generalizes to a higher level of
logical truth.
Corollary 2 For any two models M ¼ hM;\; V ;C; Ii and N ¼ hM;\; V ; C0; I0i
and any sentence /:
M/ iff N/
The analogous equivalence holds for frames and classes of frames. It is an
important result in context of the debate of the TRL since it might be seen as a peace
treaty putting an end to the logical war I reconstructed in Sect. 2 The branching
concretist model differs from the TRL model (as well as from growing universe and
presentist models) only with respect to what is an accessible context of use of a
sentence. As a result, the logic of all these models is just the same or at least a
fragment of logic described in the language we are using so far. Things change
when we introduce context dependent expression to our language, especially the
‘‘actually’’ operator (cf. Sect. 4.4). However, the fact 1 will still hold for the
indexical-free part of the language.
The perspective shifts dramatically if we switch from the truth of a sentence at a
point of evaluation to the truth of a use of a sentence at a context since different
models might differ in how to relate contexts to elements of the model:
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• First, they may disagree with respect to which possible moments are initialized
by contexts. Let us say that we have three different models based on the same
‘‘core’’ hM;\; Vi: (a) a branching concretist one MBC, where I[C] = M = C,
(b) a TRL-ist model MTRL, where ITRL[C] = TRLh, (c) and a presentist MPRES,
where IPRES[C] = {m}. Now, let us think about a use of a sentence / in a
branching concretist model MBC at a moment c such that IPRES(c) = m and
ITRLðcÞ 62 TRLh. Let us assume that MBC; c=hCON/—a use of sentence / at
context c is true at history h. The TRL-ist and presentist, if they do not want to
accept branching concretist metaphysics can do nothing but object that it is not
an accessible context. The presentist would say that there are no accessible
contexts other than the present one and the TRL-ist that there are no others than
those in our world (which initializes moments on TRLh). Hence there is no way
to judge the truth of / as used at c.
• Second, due to the differences in postsemantics, different theories might assess
the very same use of a sentence at the very same context differently. If the
sentence / at stake is a future contingent used at c in a model M, then:
• supervaluationism will simply assess both / and :/ not true (M; c 6  SUP /
and M; c 6  SUP :/);
• according to relativism, it depends on a context of assessment, at some future
context ca1, it is true ðM; c; ca1 REL /Þ and at some other ca2, it is not
ðM; c; ca2 6 REL /Þ, it is most certainly not true as assessed at
ca ¼ c; ðM; c; c 6 REL/Þ;
• the conservative believes that there is no point asking whether a use of a
future contingent at a context is true until we specify in respect of which
history the truth is stated. And there are histories h1 and h2 such that
M; c=h1 CON / and M; c=h2 CON:/;
• while the TRL-ist will simply claim that either a use of / or its negation is
true (M; cTRL / or M; cTRL :/). Moreover, it is assessed with resort to
neither the history nor the context of assessment. Note that it is exactly what
TRL theory was meant to achieve!
The concept of validity in a model (Definition 18) needs a few words of
comment. Thanks to the introduction of the set of accessible contexts C and the
initialization function I, this notion becomes a very interesting one and it might be
instructive to examine it. First of all, the whole range of sentences might be valid in
a model M even though they are not true in it. It is not an unknown phenomenon in
the philosophy of indexicals. After all, ‘‘I am here now’’ is true whenever used (it is
called valid by Kaplan and me), but it is by no means true in every model. After all,
there are lots of places and moments, such that I am not there and then. This kind of
sentence might be regarded as valid due to its linguistic properties.
Kaplan (1989a, p. 597) distinguishes another class of sentences that might be
regarded as valid due to their relation to the contexts of use. The example he gives is
‘‘Something exists’’ which is valid even though there are no indexicals in the
sentence. It is valid because, for something to be a context of use of a sentence, it
needs to exist.
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The introduction of parameters C and I brings another interesting aspect to the
notion of validity. The sentence might be valid in a model if it contingently happens
to be true in every accessible context of its use. The presentist case provides the
most evident example. Let us consider a presentist model M such that C = {c}. If c
is in the year 2012AD, then it is true to say at c that it is 2012AD. Since for the
presentist c is the only accessible context, the sentence ‘‘It is 2012AD’’ is simply
valid (with no further specification) in this very model or, if it is clear which model
we have in mind, we can simply say that the sentence ‘‘It is 2012AD’’ is valid, full
stop. There is no need to specify the context or the moment of evaluation. It is valid
simpliciter.
The divergence between different presemantic theories can be observed primarily
on the level of truth at a context and validity in a model. However, it is enough to
generalize the notion only one level further—to the level of validity in a structure
(Definition 19)—and all the differences disappear. If a sentence is valid in a
structure F, then it is truly used at every context, in every model M based on F. So
the factor of ‘‘contingent’’ content of accessible contexts which influences validity
in a model is canceled out if we take all the models into account.
4.2 Objective Complaint
What in the structure of our world could determine a single possibility from
among all the others to be ‘‘actual’’? (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162).
The question has at least two natural readings. If it is to be read as, ‘‘What in the
structure of our world makes it necessary that TRLh rather than some other possible
history represents the world as it actually is?’’, then the answer is: ‘‘Nothing!’’. The
world is indeterministic and it can develop along any of the possible ways. It simply
develops along one of them which we call TRLh.
However, if the question is to be read: ‘‘What in the structure of the world makes
it necessary that only one of the histories represents the world as it actually is?’’,
then the answer is, ‘‘The structure of the world itself.’’ According to the TRL view,
the physical, concrete universe simply does not branch in time. It resembles
something like a single spacetime and it does not contain incompatible events (e.g.
if a coin is tossed in our world, then there is the coin which shows heads in our
world, or there is the coin which shows tails in our world, but there is no place in our
world for both of these results to occur). The histories represent all the ways the
world might develop, but the world develops in one way only. Therefore, one (and
only one) of the histories must represent the world as it actually develops. There is
nothing deterministic about this result. The physical world ‘‘determines’’ the TRLh
in the very same way in which the ‘‘complex physical entity (‘the dice,’ thought of a
a single object) ð. . .Þ and its actual position determines the actual state of the (two)
dice.’’ (Kripke 1980, p. 17, emphasis mine)
To see that it is no mystery, compare Belnap et al.’s objective complaint with
another puzzle. Let there be a fair lottery in which only one of the tickets is drawn
and the drawn ticket wins, then we might ask:
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What in the structure of the lottery could determine a single ticket from among
all the others to be ‘‘the winning one.’’
If it means to ask, ‘‘What makes it necessary that ticket a rather than some other
ticket wins?’’, the answer is ‘‘Nothing!’’; after all, the lottery is fair. If, on the other
hand, the question is ‘‘What makes it necessary that only one of the tickets wins?’’,
the answer is, ‘‘The structure of the lottery itself’’—we draw the tickets just once so
one (and only one) of the tickets must win. This fact does not make the lottery
deterministic.
Is it just a misunderstanding then that leads us to think that TRL theory supports
determinism? I think that the issue is deeper than that. Notice that in the answer to
the objective complaint presented above, I appealed to the distinction between our
world and possibilities of this world. It is legitimate since the TRL theory, as I
present it, is based upon actualist modal realism. The accuracy of some such
understanding is assumed by the TRL theory outlined here.22
For the branching concretist, however, our world is identical to the collection of
concretely existing possibilities. Given this perspective, it is difficult to think of any
feature of this world which would ontologically distinguish a single branch indeed.
There are qualitative differences between histories; nonetheless, it is hard to see
how any such difference might make one of the histories in our world ‘‘the actual
one.’’ It seems, from the concretist perspective, that the only way to existentially
distinguish one of the histories is to make it the only history and, by the same token,
to accept determinism. No wonder then that the concretist treats the concept of the
Thin Red Line with such distrust.
The dispute between the branching concretist and the TRL theorist might be seen
as another manifestation of an argument between genuine (or extreme) modal
realism a` la David Lewis and actualist modal realism a` la Alvin Plantinga. As
Divers (2002, p. 300, n. 5) notices, Lewis (1986, ch. 3) argues that only genuine
realism is The Realism about possibility and accuses actualist realists of being
merely ‘ersatzers’. Analogously, branching concretists seem to believe that only
their notion of possibility is good enough to capture the Real Indeterminism.
However, some actualists (Plantinga 1987) argued quite the opposite. In their
opinion, it is only the actualist realism that can provide the True Realist notion of
possibility and David Lewis’ concretist view is some sort of ‘reductionism’. The
TRL-ist can argue along the similar lines.
22 Interestingly Belnap et al. do not argue at length for their notion of possibility either. Their main
reason is of a pragmatic nature: ‘‘We only urge that fashioning a rigorous theory of agency and
indeterminism is worthwhile, and that in doing so it is greatly useful to construe possible events as both
concrete and objective. This study presupposes, but does not argue for, this point of view.’’ (Belnap et al.
2001, p. 179.)
Moreover, in their recent paper, Placek and Belnap (2011) depart from such a concrete depiction of our
world. In their ‘‘physically motivated models,’’ they define possible moments as equivalence classes of
quadruples of reals with respect to a relation induced by an appropriate distribution of properties over
indexed quadruples in R4. Clearly, such objects are not paradigm concrete entities.
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4.3 Epistemological Complaint
[H]ow we could know whether we are on TRLabs. How could we find out?
(Belnap et al. 2001, p. 163)
If one asks oneself anything, one does it at some context. However, if our world
is in fact a huge, 4-dimensional, non-branching object, then every context c 2 C is
mapped on TRLh (which Belnap et al. call TRLabs). Consequently, whenever we ask
ourselves a question whether we are on TRLh or not, the answer is affirmative. We
do not even need to investigate. At the same time, it is contingent that TRLh rather
than some other history corresponds to our world. As a result, the sentence ‘‘I am on
TRLh’’ is like the sentence ‘‘I exist’’; they are both contingent but true whenever
used, so they are known, in a sense, a priori (cf. Kripke 1980, pp. 54ff.).
4.4 Actuality Complaint
The TRL theory also has troubles with actuality. ð. . .Þ [T]his world’s being the
actual world does not favor it over any others, but is just a reflection of the fact
that this is the world at which we are conversing. To suppose that there is one
from among the histories in Our World that is the absolutely actual history is
rather like purporting to stand outside Lewis’s realm of concrete possibilia and
pointing to the one that is actual. But this is wrong in both cases. (Belnap et al.
2001, p. 163).
There are two worries that might be extracted from this quote. The first one is
rather similar to the objective complaint. It expresses the view that TRLh is no
different from other histories and it cannot be distinguished on the basis of being
actual. I refer to Sect. 4.2 for discussion of this argument. I think that this quote also
supports my claim that there is some affinity between David Lewis’ and Belnap
et al.’s notions of possibility.
Another worry lurking in the quoted fragment originates in the observation that
the actual world is the world at which we are conversing. The authors allude to the
indexical theory of actuality. Adams (1974, p. 214) traces the origins of this idea
back to Leibniz. In the 20th century it was discussed and rejected by Arthur Prior
(see Lewis 1970, p. 185, n. 6), then articulated and ably defended by Lewis (1970)
and later formally developed by Kaplan (1989b) and applied to Ockhamism by
Belnap et al. (2001). The core of the idea is that words like ‘actually’ or ‘actual’ are
structurally similar to indexical expressions like ‘now’, ‘here’, ‘I’, etc. The
distinctive feature of these words and expressions containing them is that their
reference is not fixed once and for all, but changes from one context of use to
another. Just as ‘here’ refers to different places on different occasions of use,
‘actual’ refers to different possible circumstances depending on the context in which
it is used. This linguistic idea is quite naturally combined with the philosophical
picture presented by branching concretism (and Lewisian modal realism) since
according to this position, the possible circumstances have the same metaphysical
status as the actual ones. The only way to distinguish the latter is by using the phrase
‘‘The circumstances I am actually in.’’ A use of the word ‘‘actually’’ indicates your
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exact position on the tree of possibilities (or in the space of possible worlds). This
account of actuality might seem to be at odds with the TRL ideology since the latter
suggests that the actual world is metaphysically distinguished from any possible
history (including TRLh for that matter). However, I am going to show that my
version of the TRL theory is compatible with the indexical notion of actuality. It
shows that the indexical nature of the word ‘actually’ is partly independent of the
accepted metaphysics of possibility. In fact, my approach generates much better and
more intuitive predictions than any other account of indexical ‘‘actually’’ available
for BT.
Proceeding formally, I adopt Kaplan’s (1989b) treatment of indexicals appro-
priately modified by Belnap et al. (2001) to fit the branching framework. The lesson
from Kaplan is that to deal with the semantics of indexicals we need to take into
account the context of use of a sentence in which an indexical appears. More
precisely, we need to somehow ‘‘store’’ the information at which context sentence /
was used, so we can utilize this information evaluating the sub-sentence w of /
which contains an indexical expression. So far, our point of evaluation has a form
hM; m=hi where M ¼ hM;\; V; I; Ci. The initialization function dictates where to
start the process of evaluation of the sentence used at hM; ci, namely, we start at
I(c), but this fact is not stored in our point of evaluation. Since the used sentence
may contain modal and tense operators, the sub-sentences of it might well be
evaluated at a moment different from the context-initialized one. However, as
Kaplan makes clear, we need to keep the context of use fixed and utilize it when the
embedded indexical connective is being interpreted. For this purpose, let me add
another parameter to the point of evaluation, I will just call it a context parameter.
As a result, the new point of evaluation has the following form: hM; c; m=hi where
c 2 C.
Let me now phrase my semantic definition of the connective ‘‘it is actually the
case that’’ (@) and its competitors present in the arena. Notice that all the truth
clauses below do refer to the piece of information stored in the context parameter.
My proposal is a very simple and natural one:
1. TRL definition of Actually:
MTRL; c; m=h@/ iff MTRL; c; IðcÞ=TRLh /
The presemantic structure of M guarantees that for each c 2 C; IðcÞ 2 TRLh so the
operator @ is well-defined. Let me now present the alternative definitions available
at the BT market. All of them were designed for the branching concretist model M:
2. Conservative definition of Actually1: M; c;m=h@1/ iff M; c; IðcÞ=h0 / for
every h0 such that IðcÞ 2 h0. (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 246).
3. Conservative definition of Actually2: M; c;m=h@2 / iff eitherðaÞ IðcÞ 2 h
and M; c; IðcÞ=h/ or (b) IðcÞ 62 h and M; c; IðcÞ=h0 / for every h0 such that
IðcÞ 2 h0. Belnap et al. (2001, p. 246).
4. Supervaluationist definition of Actually: M; c; m=h@/ iff M; c; IðcÞ=h0 /
for every h0 such that IðcÞ 2 h0. (MacFarlane 2008, p. 99).
5. Relativist definition of Actually: M; c; ca; m=h@/ iff M; c; ca; IðcÞ=h0 /,
for every h0 2 HIðcÞjIðcaÞ. (MacFarlane 2008, p. 99).
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The litmus paper that I am going to use to test the definitions is the initial-
redundancy requirement for the actuality operator proposed by MacFarlane (2008).
The requirement, appropriately modified for our notation, should be understood as a
demand that for any model M, any sentence /, and any context c:
M; c/ iff M; c@/
The conservative believes that the context c is not sufficient to judge the truth
value of a use of a sentence. He additionally demands to specify the history h such
that IðcÞ 2 h. Hence the initial redundancy test for the conservative is slightly
different:
M; c=h/ iff M; c=h@/
The initial-redundancy seems to be a reasonable demand. If it is true to say that /
it should be equally true to say that @/ (and vice versa). The addition or removal of
operator @ simply makes no difference as far as uses of sentences are concerned.
The first victim of the test is the conservative operator @1. Let us say that a
sentence / is contingent at moment m if there are histories h1, h2 such that m 2
h1 \ h2 and M; c; m=h1 / and M; c; m=h2 :/. Let us now consider a sentence Fp
contingent at I(c). Let h1 be such that M; c; IðcÞ=h1 Fp, then by conservative
postsemantics M; c=h1 Fp. However, since / is contingent at I(c), there is h2 such
that M; c; IðcÞ=h2 :Fp which means that, by definition of
@1; M; c; IðcÞ=h1 :@1Fp which implies in turn, by conservative postsemantics,
that M; c=h1 :@Fp. Consequently, there is model M, sentence / and context c
such that M; c=h/ and M; c=h:@1/ which is equivalent to the failure of the
initial redundancy test. In fact, it is the case for every future contingent. Therefore,
with respect to some histories, we can truly use the sentence, ‘‘There will be a sea
battle tomorrow even though actually there will be none.’’
Belnap et al.’s (2001) alternative proposal (@2) does pass the initial redundancy
test but is not acceptable for independent reasons. It generates a number of counter-
intuitive results, for example:
• If sentence / is evaluated at a point m/h such that IðcÞ 2 h, then @2 loses a part
of its indexical nature. MacFarlane (2008, p. 99) even claims that Actually2 is
simply redundant at such points. This is not quite accurate since Actuality2
retains a part of its indexical function even at these points, it just functions as
another indexical—Now (as defined by Belnap et al. 2001, p. 246). However,
MacFarlane is partially right: at such points Actually2 loses its indexical nature
as a modal operator. It is particularly visible at context-initialized moments of
evaluation where the sentence, ‘‘The future might be different from what it
actually will be’’ ð}ðFp ^ :@2FpÞÞ is always false. Similarly, the sentence
‘‘Necessarily, there will be a sea battle if and only if there actually will be a sea
battle’’ ðhðFp $ @2FpÞÞ is always true at such points.
• For some model M, there is a sentence / and a context-initialized point of
evaluation hM; c; IðcÞ=hi such that the following is true
M; c; IðcÞ=hP}Fð/ ^ :@2/Þ ^@2/. So we can truly say ‘‘It might have
been the case that there would be a sea battle and actually there would be none
(even though there actually will be one).’’ Such oddities result from the fact that
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even if we use @2 twice in one sentence, it might behave as a modal indexical
for the first time and not as one on the other occasion.
I find these reasons decisive in abandoning @2 as a candidate for a proper
analysis of the word ‘actually’. Interestingly, there is a straightforward and formally
neat way to solve all the problems of the conservative—it is to include ‘‘the history
of a context of use’’ (hc) as an element of a context and bind the interpretation of the
operator @ with this aspect of the context in the following way: M; c; hc; m=h@/
iff M; c; hc; IðcÞ=IðhcÞ/. However, Belnap et al. (2001, p. 151) very strongly
object to the idea of the history of the context of use. I find their arguments
persuasive (contrary to e.g., Borghini and Giuliano 2011) and it is important to
stress at this point that my TRLh should not be thought of as the history of the
context of use which changes from one context to another. The history TRLh is
‘‘initialized’’ by the world itself and its structure and content rather than the context.
We have eliminated both the conservative definitions of the operator @ as
candidates for an analysis of the indexical meaning of ‘‘actually’’. However, the
remaining three proposals seem to be on a par. To differentiate between them, we
need to devise a test stronger than the initial redundancy. One reasonable
strengthening is a demand that not only uses of / and @/ should be co-true at every
context (as MacFarlane 2008 insists), but uses of their negations also should.
Formally, the stronger requirement is that both equivalences (M; c/ iff
M; c@/) and (M; c:/ iff M; c:@/) are satisfied. It sounds reasonable
since ‘‘actually’’ is a modal indexical, so it should be not only initially redundant but
redundant also in scope of extensional connectives such as negation. It amounts to
the demand that at a given context c, we can truly say that it is not the case that there
will be a sea battle if and only if we can truly say that it is not the case that there
actually will be a sea battle.
This stronger test is failed by some sentences at some points of evaluation under
every definition of ‘‘actually’’ in the BT setting that I am aware of, except my TRL
definition of @ presented above. In particular, the supervaluationist and relativist
definitions of @ fail:
Supervaluationism For every contingent sentence / used at c:M; c:@/ and
M; c 6 :/ (even though it is not true either, i.e. M; c 6 /);
Relativism For every sentence / used at c and still contingent while assessed at
ca:M; c; ca :@/ and M; c; ca 6 :/ (even though it is not true either,
M; c; ca 6 /).
The TRL definition of ‘actually’ that I proposed satisfies this stronger test in full
generality. In fact, operators : and @ are mutually ‘‘transparent,’’ i.e. the
equivalence :@/ $ @:/ is true (not only valid) in every MTRL model.
We can propose an even stronger, and yet still quite natural version of the initial-
redundancy requirement, i.e. we can demand for every context c and every sentence
/ that M; c/ $ @/. We just express the metalinguistic version of the initial-
redundancy test in the object language. It simply means that at any context, one is
guaranteed to say the truth, claiming that there will be a sea battle if and only if
there actually will be a sea battle. MacFarlane (2008) explicitly rejects this
strengthening but he agrees that we need to ‘‘get over our qualms’’ to do so (p. 99 ,
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n. 22). Again, all the treatments of ‘actually’ discussed in the literature, besides
otherwise faulty conservative @2, would falsify this equivalence whenever / is a
contingent sentence. At the same time, the equivalence / $ @/ is valid (but not
true) in every TRL-model.
It is easy to understand why the TRL model constitutes such a friendly
environment for the operator ‘actually’, while branching concretism is so hostile to
it. In the TRL theory, there is exactly one point of evaluation initialized by any use
of a sentence. Importantly, this point contains a specific history (TRLh) as its
element. It is quite evident that this very point should be utilized for interpretation
of the operator @. The TRL-ist sharply distinguishes the actual from the possible so
the interpretation of @ is quite straightforward.
The branching concretist on the other hand, denies distinguishing any ‘actual’
history. However, to retain the indexical meaning of @, he needs to tie it to some
feature of the context. The only available item seems to be ‘‘ð. . .Þ a unique causal
past, and a unique future of possibilities, the whole of which is summed up by the
moment of use’’ (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 226). As a result, he tends to identify
actuality with necessity. Belnap et al. (2001) even propose an intended reading of
@1A to be: ‘‘It is settled true at this actual moment that A’’ (2001, p. 153).
Consequently, the concretist (no matter whether conservative, supervaluationist, or
relativist) usually takes the sentence h/ $ @/ to be valid—true whenever used. In
particular, we are semantically guaranteed to be right when saying: ‘‘If only it
actually will rain tomorrow, it is settled that it will.’’ Such observations further
reinforce the concretist conviction that actuality is only a camouflaged form of
necessity and whoever talks about the actual future is a determinist in disguise.
The TRL-ist intends to disentangle the notions of actuality and necessity and he
seems to be successful in his attempt. In particular, it is not difficult to find a
sentence / and a context at which a use of @/ $ h/ is false. A similar
implication, @/ ! h@/, is true but it does not doom us to determinism. (Just as
the truth of, ‘‘If it is raining now, then it will always be the case that it was raining
now,’’ does not doom us to a flood.) It just witnesses to the indexical nature of the
operator @.
To sum up, it appears that the TRL combination of presemantics, semantics, and
postsemantics presented here generates the most intuitive predictions for the
behavior of the indexical operator ‘‘actually’’. I take this fact as another argument
for the more general thesis that the TRL theory is metaphysically underpinned by
some actualist notion of possibility.
5 Conclusions and Perspectives
In this paper, I proposed a new approach to the problem of the Thin Red Line. The
reconstruction of the history of the debate suggests that none of the existing TRL
theories is completely free of formal or conceptual worries. I decided not to
elaborate a modification of some previous solution but to rethink the basis of the
issue. My diagnosis is that the predominant impetus for the argument is
metaphysical in character; different semantic judgments naturally ensue. I argue
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that the major discrepancy consists in the contrasting notions of the world and
possibility presumed by the parties.
In my opinion, the TRL theory is a specimen of the actualist modal realism in
philosophy of possibility combined with eternalism in philosophy of time. If we
look at the Thin Red Line from this perspective, it is much easier to understand the
motivation behind this view and to defend it against the attacks. In my attempt to
secure the Thin Red Line presented above, I have presumed some actualist
interpretation of possibility, but have not endorsed any one in particular. It would be
a very interesting enterprise to investigate which (if any) of the actualist conceptions
is best suited for the general project of modeling temporal possibility and
metaphysical indeterminism.
I proposed a theory-neutral formalism which explicates the semantic impact of
various metaphysical beliefs. In this framework, I expressed the most important
theories of future contingents elaborated in the context of Branching-Time. To this
effect, I adapted and extended the terminology of MacFarlane (2003, 2008) and
divided the semantic labor between presemantics, postsemantics and semantics
proper. The first notion is particularly important since it enables one to clearly
distinguish the TRL-ist’s position from the alternatives. Formally speaking, the TRL
view comes down to three assumptions:
• the presemantic one: I[C] = TRLh;
• the semantic one: Ockhamism is the accurate semantics for our tempo-modal
language;
• the postsemantic one: MTRL; cTRL/ iff M; c; IðcÞ=TRLh /.
The essential commitment of this construed TRL theory is that the contexts are
linearly ordered so no context initializes a possible moment outside TRLh. One of
the consequences of this commitment is that the theory cannot afford the operators
which shift the context parameter to the positions which initialize possible moments
outside TRLh. As I mentioned, such operators are sometimes used in the context of
BT to give an account of speech reports. An interesting future project would be to
provide an analysis compatible with TRL metaphysics.
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